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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Steven Shepherd appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion
when it relinquished jurisdiction over him or, in the alternative, when it failed to further
reduce his sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction. He also contends that the grounds
of appeal make out a colorable need for the inclusion of the transcript of the July 17,
2003, sentencing hearing in the appellate record, such that, even under the Idaho
Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Brunet, _

Idaho _ , 2013 WL 6001894

(2013), reh'g denied, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny his motion to
augment the record with that transcript violated his constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection. As a result, this Court should grant Mr. Shepherd access to the
requested transcripts and allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing raising
any issues arising from review of those transcripts.
In the event that request is denied, this Court should still vacate the district
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Shepherd and remand this case for an
order placing him on probation.

Alternatively, this Court should either reduce his

sentence as it sees fit or remand the case so the district court can reduce his sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2003, Mr. Shepherd pied guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a child, sixteen
or seventeen years of age. (R., pp.9-10, 44-45, 48-49.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, though it suspended that sentence
for a ten-year period of probation. (R., pp.55, 57-58.) Nine years later, the State filed a
motion to revoke Mr. Shepherd's probation.

1

The district court held an evidentiary
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hearing on that motion, and found that Mr. Shepherd had violated his probation. (R.,
pp.150-54.)
In preparation for disposition on the probation violation, the district court ordered
an updated presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI). That report indicated
that the issues underlying Mr. Shepherd's violations stemmed from a bout with
depression following his divorce, as well as being denied access to the addiction
recovery program offered through his church. (PSI, pp.4-5.) 1 It also revealed that the
2003 conviction was Mr. Shepherd's first felony offense, and that he only had one other
misdemeanor offense on his record. (PSI, pp.5-6.) However, the PSI noted that Mr.
Shepherd had repeatedly violated the terms of his probation during the course of his
probation.

(PSI, p.6.) For example, he admitted to viewing pornography on several

different occasions.

(PSI, p.6.) The PSI mentioned that Mr. Shepherd had ongoing

support from family and friends, and that he suffered from depression. (PSI, pp.8, 13,
22-29.)

Considering all this information, the presentence investigator recommended

that the district court revoke probation and retain jurisdiction over Mr. Shepherd. (PSI,
p.16.)
The State concurred with the recommendation for a period of retained
jurisdiction.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.2, Ls.16-18.)2

Defense counsel argued that, since

Mr. Shepherd had served eight and one-half months in custody after being arrested on

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"ShepherdPSI." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents attached
thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.).
2 The transcripts in this case were provided in two separately bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts
from the probation violation hearing held on May 10, 2012, and the rider review hearing
held over the course of two days (February 28, 2013, and April 3, 2013). "Vol.2" will
refer to the volume containing the transcript from the disposition hearing held on August
30, 2012.
1

2
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the allegation of probation violation, Mr. Shepherd should be returned to probation
instead. (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.2 - p.12, 3.) The district court decided that it would revoke
Mr. Shepherd's probation, but, in recognition of Mr. Shepherd's efforts during his nine
years on probation, it would retain jurisdiction while he participated in the rider program.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.14, Ls.23-25; R., pp.156-58.)
Subsequently, the rider staff provided an addendum to the PSI report
(hereinafter, APSI), which evaluated Mr. Shepherd's performance during the rider

program. (PSI, pp.84-88.) The staff recommended that Mr. Shepherd be returned to
probation.

(PSI, p.84.)

The APSI noted that Mr. Shepherd had demonstrated

amenability to treatment and had completed all his assigned programs.

(PSI, p.85.)

It informed the district court that Mr. Shepherd had received no disciplinary sanctions,
formal or informal, during his period of retained jurisdiction.

(PSI, pp.85-86.)

The

appended Sex Offender Risk Assessment also concluded that Mr. Shepherd presented
a low risk for sexually-based recidivism and a low-moderate risk for overall recidivism.
(See PSI, pp.89-90; Tr., Vol.1, p.156, Ls.3-11.) However, the APSI also indicated that
Mr. Shepherd's performance during the rider program was not at the highest level.
(See, e.g., PSI, p.86 ("Staff reported that Mr. Shepherd was not an overly driven
individual to go above and beyond, but that they had no reason to let him go.").) It also
noted that he was, at least, hypersensitive, if not purposefully disruptive, during some of
the programs, which negatively impacted his treatment group.

(PSI, p.87.)

Despite

those issues, the staff ultimately recommended his release back to probation,
concluding:
Mr. Shepherd has completed all of the assigned program. He has not
been a disciplinary problem while at NICI. He was able to articulate
ownership for his behavior and thinking which led to his violating his
probation. Mr. Shepherd is an emotionally immature man. He will

3
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outcomes.
(PSI, p.88.)
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The district court expressed concerns about the APSI report and the propriety of
its recommendation, given some of the comments in the narrative, which suggested to
the district court that Mr. Shepherd was still minimizing his behavior. (Tr., Vol.1, p.100,
Ls.2-5.) As such, it found the recommendation for probation to be "totally contradictory
almost with the facts as reflected in the treatment notes." (Tr., Vol.1, p.110, Ls.10-13.)
Therefore, it continued the hearing so that the authors of the report could be present
and offer testimony as to their recommendation. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.100, L.14- p.104,
L.4.)
At the subsequent review hearing, Naomi Laurino and Bryan Gimmeson offered
testimony regarding their recommendation in the APSI. Ms. Laurino testified that, while
Mr. Shepherd was not pushing himself in the program, he had not performed so poorly
as to be determined "not amenable" to treatment efforts. (Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.3-18.)
However, she testified that she did not think he would be successful on probation.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.124, Ls.14-22.) To that end, Ms. Laurino testified about the approach that
the Idaho Department of Correction (hereinafter, IDOC) has in regard to rider staff's
recommendations when a defendant is finished with a rider program. Her testimony,
read alongside that offered by Mr. Gimmeson, indicates that IDOC's policy is to not
incarcerate people unnecessarily, to give them the benefit of the doubt, and therefore,
to not recommend relinquishment unless there is "[a] DOR, 3 some overt acting out."
(Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.3-6.)

Ms. Laurino testified that this approach was based on

4
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IDOC's a desire to have "zero growth within the populations,"4 and so the rider staff was
supposed to be "very judicious in who we recommend for relinquish[ment]." (Tr., Vol.1,
p.121, Ls.15-23.) Mr. Gimmeson explained that incarcerating defendants in this
situation risks losing the opportunity to rehabilitate them, and instead, turn them into
"better criminal[s]." (Tr., Vol.1, p.148, Ls.1-5.)
Mr. Gimmeson testified that his recommendation that Mr. Shepherd be returned
to probation was based on the fact that Mr. Shepherd had participated in the program,
doing what he was supposed to do (though he did point out that he would have
preferred to see a higher level of participation from Mr. Shepherd).
L.14 - p.148, L.5.)

(Tr., Vol.1, p.147,

Therefore, given his evaluation of Mr. Shepherd's risk level for

recidivism - low for sexually-based recidivism and low-moderate for overall recidivism
(Tr., Vol.1, p.156, Ls.3-11) - Mr. Gimmeson concluded that Mr. Shepherd "would be
better served in the community environment to go treatment versus go to prison .... "
(Tr., Vol.1, p.148, Ls.2-5.)
Mr. Gimmeson also described an alternative treatment option - the moderate risk
sex offender program available at the "Institutional Idaho Correctional Institute of
Orofino [sic]" or ICIO facility. 5 (Tr., Vol.1, p.148, L.6-p.149, L.10; Tr., Vol.1, p.151,
Ls.16-22.) However, the only way for Mr. Shepherd to gain access to that program was
to have the district court relinquish jurisdiction or to commit a new sex offense.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.150, Ls.1-5.) Nevertheless, Mr. Gimmeson did not feel a recommendation

A formal disciplinary report.
Ms. Laurino also suggested that this policy was the result of the fact that "we're out of
space in the prison." (See Tr., Vol.1, p.121 , Ls.15-23.)
5 According to Mr. Gimmeson, this program was a longer term program than the rider
program and functioned more like a community with reduced risk factors (i.e., reduced
access to pornography), and as such, and was more able to deal with issues, such as
3

4
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for relinquishment was appropriate, since Mr. Shepherd did not have serious behavioral
problems and because he thought Mr. Shepherd could be successful on probation,
despite the possibility that he could struggle at times during the course of such a term of
probation. (Tr., Vol.1, p.150, L.25- p.151, L.14.)
The district court decided that the evidence presented demonstrated insufficient
progress in rehabilitation to justify a period of probation, and so, it relinquished
jurisdiction over Mr. Shepherd.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.182, L.5 - p.183, L.24.)

However, the

district court did exercise its authority under I.C.R. 35 and reduced Mr. Shepherd's
sentence from a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, to a unified
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.185, L.24- p.186, L.10; R., p.171.)
It also recommended that Mr. Shepherd be placed in the ICIO program.

(Tr., Vol.1,

pp.10-13.)
Mr. Shepherd filed a notice of appeal which was timely from the order
relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.166-68.) On appeal, he moved to augment the record
with transcripts from three hearings: the entry of plea hearing held on April 17, 2003,
the sentencing hearing held on July 17, 2003, and the admit/deny hearing held on
March 22, 2012.

(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and

Statement in Support Thereof, filed September 17, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court
denied that motion. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule, dated October 15, 2013.)

mental health concerns, in the overall treatment process.
L.12 - p.149, L.10.)

6
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Shepherd due process and equal
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts
necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction
over Mr. Shepherd, or, alternatively, by not further reducing his sentence when it
did so.

7

I

I
.'

ARGUMENT

I
I
I

I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

I
I
I

I
I

I

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Shepherd Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For
Review Of The Issues On Appeal
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered when indigent defendants are
entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal. Brunet , _

Idaho _ ,

2013 WL 6001894. Its opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that,
when reviewing decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court
conducts an independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Id. at 4 (citing State v.

Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)). The Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that there is
a federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to provide transcripts
sufficient for an adequate appellate review.

See id. at 2-3 (citing Mayer v. City of

Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002)).
That requirement is part of the guarantees in the United States Constitution and
the Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall have due process
and equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13.
Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."

Lassiterv. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho
at 445. Those same standards have been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho
221, 227 (1998).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
transcripts must be provided to indigent defendants when such a right is established.

8
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Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963); Mayer, 404 U.S. 189. Its decisions
have established two fundamental themes.

First, the scope of the due process and

equal protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants
is not tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate
review, but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. See, e.g.,
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195.
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in order to show that the
transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for
its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the additional
transcripts.'' 7 Brunet,_ Idaho_, 2013 WL 6001894 at 3; but see Mayer, 404 U.S.

6

In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious
discriminations.

Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).
"It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ...
and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to
support the actions of the trial court." 7 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999);
see also Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805 (applying this presumption in absence of a complete
record). Therefore, if Mr. Shepherd fails to provide the appellate court with the
transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will apply and
Mr. Shepherd's claims regarding the relinquishment of jurisdiction will not be addressed

7
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complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds").
The grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the
sentencing hearing held on July 17, 2003. 8 The minutes of that hearing only indicate
Mr. Shepherd "[a]ddresses the Court."

(R., p.55.)

The minutes do not reveal the

contents of that address. (See generally R., pp.54-55.) When a defendant makes a
statement of allocution at a sentencing hearing, those comments are relevant to the
sentencing determination.

See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App.

2003), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct.
App. 2013), rev. denied, (finding that, while allocution is important, it does not rise to the
level of a constitutionally protected right, as the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had
suggested).

Additionally, the record indicates that the father of the victim made a

statement to the district court. (R., p.54.) The minutes of the hearing do not reveal the

on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme Court not
affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive him of an effective appeal,
making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection grounds.
See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is "constitutionally
invalid ... to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal") (emphasis added).
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485.
In this situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to
relinquish jurisdiction because the district court obviously concluded at the sentencing
hearing that the aggravating information was insufficient to justify incarcerating
Mr. Shepherd, given the objectives of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Merwin,
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998).
8 Mr. Shepherd is not challenging the denial of his request for the transcript of the entry
of plea hearing held on April 17, 2003, or the transcript of the admit/deny hearing held
on March 22, 2012, in this appeal.
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contents of that statement either. 9

(See generally R., pp.54-55.)

A victim impact

statement is also a factor to be considered by the district court when it imposes a
sentence. See, e.g.,

IDAHO CONST.,

Art. I, §22(6) ("A crime victim, as defined by statute,

ahs the following rights: . . . To be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice
proceedings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the
defendant, unless manifest injustice would result.") Therefore, a transcript is necessary
for the appellate court to evaluate the entire record available to the district court when it
subsequently relinquished jurisdiction. See Brunet, _

Idaho _ , 2013 WL 6001894

at 4.
Those statements are part of the record before the district court because the
district court is entitled to rely the knowledge gained from its own official position and
observations, and thus, it is actually expected to rely on its memory of prior proceedings
in a case.

See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also

State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge

in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial);
State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely

upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed
in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved");
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the district

court "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers

9

Since the minutes do not reveal the contents of either statement, they are insufficient
to provide an adequate appellate record in regard to Mr. Shepherd's challenge that the
district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction, executing the
sentence imposed at the July 17, 2003, hearing. Compare Brunet,_ Idaho_, 2013
WL 6001894, p.3 (discussing how the minutes in the record of that case were sufficient

to provide an adequate appellate record).
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all relevant facts in reaching a decision"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App.
1984) (noting that "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already
knew about [the defendant] from the other case").

Since the same district court judge

who relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shepherd also presided over the July 17, 2003,
sentencing hearing (compare R., pp.54, 164, 170-71), the comments made by the
victim's father and by Mr. Shepherd at the July 17, 2003, sentencing hearing are part of
the record that was available to the district court when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Shepherd.
Therefore, because both statements impact the sentencing decision and were
part of the record before the district court, there is a colorable need for the transcript of
the July 17, 2003, sentencing hearing to be augmented to the record, so that the
appellate court has an adequate record upon which to conduct its review of the entire
record available to the district court when it relinquished jurisdiction and executed
Mr. Shepherd's sentence. 10 See Brunet, _

Idaho _ , 2013 WL 6001894 at 3. As

10

In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate
Mr. Shepherd's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Evitts
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). Appellate
counsel is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in
support of the best arguments to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The standards for effective appellate representation are set forth
in the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense
Function. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432 (1991). Specifically, Standard 4-8.3(b) provides:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
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such, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Shepherd's request to augment
the record with that transcript violates his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection.
11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Shepherd, Or, Alternatively, By Not Further Reducing His Sentence When It Did So

A.

The District Court Erred When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse

of discretion standard.

State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011 );

State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001 ). Such a decision will not be considered an
abuse of discretion "if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate." 11

State

v. Merwin, 131

Idaho 642, 648 (1998). "The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence
is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitation
potential and suitability for probation."
1990).

State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App.

In making that determination, the district court "considers all of the

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can
neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on
appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's decision to
revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise
Mr. Shepherd on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. Therefore,
Mr. Shepherd has not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the
merits of his claims and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in
that endeavor.
11 The policy referred to by the rider staff members - to be judicious as to who receives
recommendations for relinquishment (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.3-23) - is
consistent with the approach that the Idaho Supreme Court articulated in Merwin, as
well as the approach set forth by the Legislature: "The court shall deal with a person
who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment
unless . . . it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the
public .... ") I.C. § 19-2521(1) (emphasis added).
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circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured
environment and to determine the course of action that will further the purposes of
rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and retribution." Statton, 136 Idaho at
137. It is guided in this determination by I.C. § 19-2521. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. In
this regard, the need to protect society is the primary objective the court should
consider.

See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

disposition that protects society and

also

accomplishes the

As such, a

other objectives

(rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment) will be considered reasonable.

See id.

This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives,
and therefore, each must be addressed in the disposition. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho
at 500.
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the
objectives are served by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318,
320 (2006).

They include, but are not limited to:

"the defendant's good character,

status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to
treatment, and support of family." Id. These factors are also embodied in the factors
set forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis
for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482,
489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991 );

State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117
Idaho 295, 301 (1990); and State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case,
several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the court as it
made its disposition regarding Mr. Shepherd after he completed his period of retained

14
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jurisdiction. A sufficient consideration reveals that Mr. Shepherd's performance during
his period of retained jurisdiction, when combined with the mitigating factors present in
his case, indicate that he should be able to succeed in a less structured environment
and a disposition providing him with the opportunity to do so will still serve the
objectives.

Therefore, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction does not serve the

objectives, and is an abuse of the district court's discretion.
Mr. Gimmeson pointed out that Mr. Shepherd only presented a low-moderate risk
for recidivism generally and a low risk for sexually-based recidivism. (Tr., Vol.1, p.156,
Ls.3-11.) Sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the prison system to
continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of
recidivism.

Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App.

1988). The decision to relinquish jurisdiction and incarcerate Mr. Shepherd for up to ten
years, despite the fact that he does not have a significant risk for reoffending means
that the district court's decision operates contrary Cook and Eubank.

As such, it

constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion.
Additionally, the underlying offense was Mr. Shepherd's first felony offense and
second offense overall. (PSI, pp.5-6.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that
the first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal."
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595 (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)). This is because

such a person does not yet have a fixed character for crime and so rehabilitation at this
point is more likely. Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Therefore, since this is Mr. Shepherd's
first felony and he is not a habitual offender, the time to employ rehabilitative options is
now. Timing is also an important consideration when addressing rehabilitation. See id.;
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639.

Furthermore, both rider staff members testified that Mr. Shepherd has

demonstrated amenability to treatment.

(See Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.3-18; Tr., Vol.1,

p.147, L.14 - p.148, L.5.) Thus, in order to take advantage of that amenability, timely
rehabilitative efforts should be undertaken. 12
Furthermore, Mr. Shepherd has a support network in place.

(See, e.g., PSI,

pp.8, 22-29.) Family constitutes an important part of a support network, which can help
in rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial
support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been
offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration).

In

addition, Mr. Shepherd has demonstrated that he can and will provide service to his
community, as he has served in the Army and the National Guard. (See PSI, p.156
(Mr. Shepherd's discharge papers, indicating he was honorably discharged in 1999);
Tr., Vol.1, p.65, Ls.24-25 (indicating that Mr. Shepherd served in the National Guard
from 1999 through 2004).) In fact, Mr. Shepherd suffers a ten percent disability as a
result of his service. (PSI, p.109.) A good record of military service is another factor
which should be considered in mitigation. State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, _ , 508 P.2d
141, 144 (1973); State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437,441 (Ct. App. 2006).
Finally, as the PSI pointed out, the violations of the terms of probation which led
to Mr. Shepherd's period of retained jurisdiction stemmed from a bout with depression

12

As Mr. Gimmeson suggested, not taking advantage of this opportunity and
incarcerating Mr. Shepherd risks losing the opportunity to rehabilitate Mr. Shepherd,
and instead, turn him into a "better criminal." (Tr., Vol.1, p.148, Ls.1-5.) That result
would actually provide less protection for society, since Mr. Shepherd will be released
from incarceration at some point in the future.
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following his divorce, as well as being denied access to the ARP program offered
through his church.

(PSI, pp.4-5.)

Idaho Code § 19-2523 not only suggests, but

requires, the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor.
See Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

If Mr. Shepherd was suffering a

depressive episode, as the PSI suggests (see PSI, pp.4-5), that could impact his
performance during the rider program. Furthermore, his behavior on probation prior to
that episode was mostly laudatory, evidenced by the fact that there were no motions for
probation revocation filed for nine years. That suggests that, when Mr. Shepherd has
his depression under control, he is more capable of being successful on probation.
That supports Mr. Gimmeson's conclusion that, while Mr. Shepherd might have some
struggles with probation, ultimately, he is likely to be successful on probation.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.151, Ls.10-14.)
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence,
which considers rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives - protection of
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993)
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes and
executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the
imposed sentence are still present.

See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15

(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those
objectives).

In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of the Board of

Correction and the looming sentence, he would also be deprived of several of his rights

I

(such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the

I
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district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute the original
sentence if Mr. Shepherd were to fail to adhere to the terms of his probation. However,
it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed. What the
probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the opportunity to
rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Shepherd to apply the lessons he would
gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. 13
B.

Alternatively, The District Court Erred When It Did Not Further Reduce
Mr. Shepherd's Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, it

did abuse its discretion by not further reducing Mr. Shepherd's sentence, sua sponte,
pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so.

After a defendant has completed a period of

retained jurisdiction, the district court may suspend the sentence, which results in the
defendant being placed on probation, or it can resume the execution of the underlying
sentence. State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003). If the district court
decides to resume the execution of the underlying sentence, it also has the authority to
reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. Id.; see also State v. Timbana,
145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008) (applying the same rule to the decision to the similar
situation of probation revocation).
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington,
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in

13

While the district court did recommend Mr. Shepherd's participation in ICIO's sex
offender program, the final determination on what, if any, rehabilitative programming an
inmate receives while incarcerated is left to the Department of Corrections. See, e.g.,
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005). As such, this recommendation does not
ensure continued rehabilitative opportunities to the same degree a period of probation
would.
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such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. (citing among
others, Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently
consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the
record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should result in a
more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at
595.
While the district court did reduce the total fixed time Mr. Shepherd would be
required to serve when it relinquished jurisdiction, it should have gone further.

In

addition to the factors discussed in Section ll(A), supra, a further reduction of the
sentence was also merited by Mr. Shepherd's completion of nine years of his period of
probation without a reported violation and his successes during the rider program. All
three of these factors demonstrate that Mr. Shepherd was working to comply with the
rules while under the State's supervision, and his successes in that regard deserve
recognition. Recognition of Mr. Shepherd's successes in this manner actually improves
the likelihood that future rehabilitative opportunities will be successful, and therefore,
better promotes the ultimate protection of society. Otherwise, as Mr. Gimmeson pointed
out, all the district court's decision to incarcerate does is put Mr. Shepherd in a situation
where he is more likely to become a "better criminal."

(Tr., Vol.1, p.148, Ls.1-5.)

Therefore, to promote the overall protection of society, the district court should have
further reduced Mr. Shepherd's sentence when it revoked his probation.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Shepherd respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Shepherd respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand this case
for an order placing him on probation. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce
his sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence
pursuant to I.C.R. 35.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2014.
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BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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